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Lecturer in Psychiatry, Charing Cross Hospital Medical School, London SW6 In November 1981, the European Court of Human Rights sitting in Strasbourg, delivered judgment on a case concerning the detention of a psychiatric patient in the United Kingdom. This paper examines those findings, and their relationship to current practice and legislation in this country in the context of the European Convention on Human Rights, to which the United Kingdom, together with 20 other European countries, is a party. The reason for recall eventually given by the Home Secretary to the patient's solicitors was that the Probation Officer had reported that the patient's condition 'was giving cause for concern'. The patient maintained that this recall contravened his human rights. The Court first considered Article 5 (1) of the Convention, which is of particular importance to psychiatric patients and reads as follows: 'Everyone has the right to liberty and security of the person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law'. The listed cases include 'the lawful detention of a person after conviction by a competent court' and 'the lawful detention of a person of unsound mind'.
In considering Article 5 (1), the Court recalled its recent judgment of 24 October 1979, in the case Winterwerp versus the Netherlands, in which it was established that three minimum conditions must be satisfied in order that there may be 'lawful detention of a person of unsound mind' within the meaning of the above-mentioned provision. These are as follows: (a) Except in emergency cases, the individual concerned must be reliably shown to be of unsound mind, or in other words, a true mental disorder must be established before a competent authority on the basis of objective medical expertise. (b) The mental disorder must be of a kind or degree warranting compulsory confinement. (c) The validity of such confinement must depend on the persistence of such a disorder.
It was argued on behalf of X, who had since died, that the deprivation of his liberty was unlawful as he had not been 'reliably' shown to be of unsound mind by objective medical evidence at the time of his recall. The Court, however, did not find any violation under this provision, and stated that the action of the authorities at this time must be viewed against the background of this man's previous history, including his record of impulsive and dangerous conduct under stress. In fact his discharge in 1971 was made conditional upon, among other things, his attendance and medical supervision at a psychiatric outpatient clinic, and the consultant psychiatrist at this clinic had specifically mentioned the need to steer him clear of situations 'which could lead to murder or serious bodily harm to other people'. It was, therefore, felt to be reasonable for the responsible medical officer at Broadmoor to become alarmed at the possibility of further violence when X heard of his wife's intention to leave him. The Court held that there were circumstances where the interests of the protection of the public prevail over the individual's right to liberty, and that emergency confinement without the usual guarantees was justified in this case, as the Home Secretary had sufficient reason to take the view that this man's continued liberty constituted a danger to the public and, in particular, to his wife. As to his subsequent continued detention, the Court held that in the circumstances this too satisfied the minimum criteria, as the responsible medical officer at Broadmoor, having examined this man on his readmission, was of the opinion that he should be further detained for treatment. In fact, subsequent medical reports over a period of time indicated that X continued in a psychotic state. The Court saw no reason to doubt the objectivity and reliability of this medical assessment.
The Court then went on to consider Article 5 (4) of the Convention which reads: 'Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court, and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful'. Once again the Court recalled its previous judgment against the Netherlands, in which it stated that the detention of persons of unsound mind constituted a special category of deprivation of liberty, with its own specific problems. In particular, the problem was posed that the reasons initially warranting confinement of this kind are not static and may cease to exist, and although the initial decision may have been issued from a court (in this case in 1968), it would still be necessary that a review of lawfulness be available at reasonable intervals.
By virtue of Article 5 (4) of the Convention, the Court maintained that a person of unsound mind compulsorily confined in a psychiatric institution for an indefinite or lengthy stay, is in principle entitled (at any rate where there is no automatic periodic review of a judicial character) to take proceedings at reasonable intervals before a court, to ascertain the lawfulness of the detention under the Convention, whether that detention had been ordered by a civil or criminal court, or by any other authority.
X did have access, by means of habeas corpus proceedings, to a court which ruled that his detention was lawful in terms of English law; but this is not on its own sufficient, as the Convention makes the lawfulness of detention of persons of unsound mind subject to certain conditions over and above conformity with domestic law. In fact, in habeas corpus proceedings, the domestic court's task in examining an administrative decision to detain is to enquire 'whether the detention is in compliance with the requirements stated in the relevant legislation and the applicable principles of the common law. Whilst adequate for emergency measures, the Court did not consider that such a judicial review was sufficient for a continuing confinement such as the one in question.
Article 5 (4) of the Convention does not embody a right to have the discretion ofa domestic court substituted 'for that of the decision-making authority (in this case, the Home Secretary), but the Court felt that nevertheless the review should be wide enough to bear on those conditions which are essential for the lawful detention of a person on the grounds of mental insanity under the Convention, especially as the reasons capable of initially justifying such a detention may cease to exist.
It was, therefore, concluded that during the period of this patient's detention subsequent to his readmission to Broadmoor in April 1974, he should have been entitled to take proceedings before a court for a review of the lawfulness of his detention.
An interesting point which came up for discussion was whether the position was remedied by the ability of the patient to ask for his case to be referred to a Mental Health Tribunal. The Court accepted that the word 'court' in Article 5 (4) is not necessarily to be understood as signifying a court of law of the classic kind, but an independent body which can guarantee a Judicial procedure appropriate to the deprivation of liberty in question. The Court also accepted that the Mental Health Act 1959 provided the opportunity for periodic review on a comprehensive factual basis by Mental Health Tribunals. However, the Court held that even supposing that these bodies could be regarded as fulfilling the conditions of a 'court' in the above sense, they still lacked the competence to decide the lawfulness of a detention, and even if they found such a detention to be unlawful, they lacked the ability to order release as they had advisory functions only.
It will have been noted that this judgment of the European Court of Human Rights drew considerably on what had been decided by the same court in the earlier judgment Winterwerp versus the Netherlands, which raised similar issues concerning a psychiatric patient committed to a Dutch psychiatric hospital. This earlier judgment was followed by a supplementary one under Article 50 of the Convention which provides for the affording of just satisfaction to the injured party. It so happened that in this supplementary judgment the Court merely sanctioned the 'equitable nature' of a settlement which had been amicably reached. In X's case, counsel indicated at the hearing that he would be submitting a claim for just satisfaction to obtain reform of the law and compensation for damages suffered, and so in this respect the matter is still not fully concluded.
Both the Winterwerp and the X judgments (contrary to the usual practice, X's identity was never made public in accordance with the wishes of his next of kin) have been taken into account for the purposes of the relevant law revision, both in the Netherlands and in this country. The Bill which has recently been before Parliament in the United Kingdom proposed that patients should be automatically reviewed by a Mental Health Tribunal every three years and that these Tribunals should be empowered to discharge restricted as well as unrestricted patients. The interesting legal position in the United Kingdom is that although as a treaty the Convention is strictly not part of its law, still as a matter oflegal policy regard must be had to the country's international obligations to observe the European Convention as interpreted by the European Court of Human Rights, and in theory the ultimate sanction may be expulsion from the Council of Europe.
Finally, the undoubted significance of the X decision must be assessed realistically. Two interesting and opposite views were expressed shortly after the decision was given. A report by Ballantyne & Hencke in The Guardian of 6 November 1981 referred to it 'as a victory for MIND', the mental health charity which had taken the case to Strasbourg in the first place; and Mr Larry Gostin, MIND's legal director, was quoted as saying that this judgment necessitated a fundamental reform of the 1959 Mental Health Act. On the other hand, Professor F A Jenner of the Department of Psychiatry of Sheffield University (and who, in fact, had previously treated X), was reported in The Guardian of 13 November 1981 as having described the victory as a hollow one in human terms, in the sense that the point was a legalistic and not a human one since even the European Court had agreed that the man had been rightly recalled to hospital.
